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mere malice, as the judge ruled, below," but no such point was in
judgment. The exceptions came from the plaintiff, and it can only
be regarded as an obiter dictum of the judge ; the case found, that
the defendant had dug his well in that place on his land, where it
was most convenient for him ; and we think, as applied to a case
lke the one then at bar and the one now before us, the position
ws unsound, and against principle and authority.
Judgment of the County Court reversed, and the cause remanded.

RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS.

In the Court of Queen's Bench.
REG. vs. MARIA CLARKE IN RE ALICIA RACE."
n infant of the age of ten years was brought up on habeas corpus upon the application of the mother who was surviving parent, the father who was a marine,
having died with6ut appointing a guardian. The object of the mother, who was
a Roman Catholic, was to remove the infant from a school under the Commissioners of the Royal Patriotic Fund, at which she had placed her in 1855, and to
have her educated in a Roman Catholic school. Held, that the mother as guardian for nurture, was entitled to the custody of the person of the child; that the
court could not examine the infant as to her wishes or religious belief; that the
mother was not hound to educate her in the Protestant faith, nor had she lost
her right over her by committing her to the care of the Commissioners of the
Royal Patriotic Fund; and therefore the court was hound to order her to be delivered to her mother.

January 1. --2 A writ of habeas corpus had been issued directed
to Maria Clarke, the matron of the Sailor's Orphan Girl's School
at Hampstead, to bring up the body of Alicia Race. The return
by the matron stated that Alicia Race had been placed in the school
by the Commissioners of the Royal Patriotic Fund ; that she had
not detained and did not detain her against her will, but that Alicia
Race had continued with her, at her own desire.
121 .Turist, 335.
'Before Lord Campbell, C. J., Wightman and Cromp ton, .J.
in the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Coleridge, J., was
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Shee, Serjeant, moved that Alicia Race should be delivered to
the mother.
O'Malley, contra.-The court will leave the child to choose for
herself.
Bovill, for the Commissioners of the Patriotic Fund.-The court
I
will not force the child to go to its mother.
It appeared that the mother, Alicia Race, was the widow of Lauman Race, late a Sergeant of Mlarines on board her lajesty's ship
Pique, who was killed at the attack upon Petropaulovski, in September, 1854, and that she had by him two children, John, aged
about twelve years, and the said Alicia, aged ten years and a-half.
In July, 1855, she sent her daughter to the Sailor's Orphan Girl's
School, which was under the control of the Commissioners of the
Royal Patriotic Fund, and in which she would be maintained,
clothed and educated, until she was fit for a situation, and then
would be fitted out for it. The boy had been, with her concurrence,
placed in the Sailor's Orphan Boy's School at Chardstock, in Dorsetshire, also supported out of the Patriotic Fund ; but on the 25th
October, 1856, she removed him, and was now desirous to remove
her daughter from the Sailor's Orphan Girl's School, for the purpose of having her educated in a Roman Catholic School. The
father was a member of the Church of England, and the mother a
Roman Catholic ; and during his lifetime she had with his consent,
given their children such religious instruction as was in accordance
with her own religious' profession, and taught them to say Romai
Catholic prayers ; but the father attended the service of the Church
of England, and during the time he was stationed at Chatham the
children attended the regimental schools, which were conducted on
Protestant principles; and they had been baptized by a clergyman
of the Church of England. The father, by his will, dated the 24th
August, 1854, after bequeathing all his property to his wife, directed
that his Bible and papers.should be sent to her; and the will concluded with the following clause :-" I do hereby nominate, constitute, and appoint my wife, Alicia Race, executor of this my will
and testament, feeling confident that she will do justice to my dear
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children as a wife and mother."
lowing letter to his wife:

539

On the next day he wrote the fol-

"Her Majesty's ship Pique at Sea,
August 25, 1854.
"My dear wife and children :-I now sit down to write a few
lines to you previous to going into action.

When you receive this

I shall be no more, as it will not be sent to you if I survive. I hope
you are all quite well, as I am at the present time. My dears, I
write to bid you an eternal farewell, if such is God's will that I am
to be cut off; but I trust in Providence, and hope I may be
spared to meet you again; but as we cannot all expect to survive to
tell the tale, and I may be one that is doomed to die in defence of
my Queen and country, therefore, my dear wife, it will be a consolation that I died in defence of liberty and done my best, as in
duty bound by my oath when I took to the profession of arms. My
dear Alicia, I have made my will to you, and I trust you will carry
it out according to my wish. I wish, my dear, that you will remain
a widow until the children are capable of taking care of themselves.
I hope, my dear, that you will not disregard this my last wish, as
I should not die happy if I thought a step-father would be over my
babes; but I feel confident that you will not forget my last wish.
My dear wife, I have not received a letter from you, or any one
else, since I left England. I should feel very happy to hear from
you before I am called into eternity; but the Lord's will be done.
We must bow to His command. My dear Ally, I am but ill-prepared to meet my Maker face to face, but I trust he will have mercy
upon my poor soul, and forgive m6 my transgressions, as I forgive all
men that have done me any wrong, before I die. I have settled all
my worldly affairs as well as I can. My dear wife, kiss my dear
children for me, as a last embrace from a loving father, and tell
them that his last thoughts were for them, and bring them up in the
fear of the Lord. My dear wife, I think I see poor Alicia, by turns,
for the loss of her poor old man, and then I see her rejoicing at his.
return ; but, alas, such dreams ! My dear, I have written a farewell letter to my mother, brothers, and sisters, and all friends and
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relations, and I trust you will not be forgotten by them. My dearest wife, give my dying love to your mother and sister, and all your
friends that may befriend you or my dear children. May we all
mett in heaven, is the last prayer of one that you know how to prize,
although he will be in eternity when you receive this last letter'he
ever wrote, as we are only waitingfor the morning to dawn to go into
Petropaulovski and commence the work of destruction. It is a Russian colony, and we are bound to take it, or die in the attempt. My
dear wife and children, it is late, and I require some rest before I
commence the work of carnage that to-morrow may bring forth.
My dear, I have not set my foot on shore but twice since I left
England, and then only for a few hours, on duty. The last from
your affectionate, loving husband,
LAUMAN RACE."
The girl had expressed a strong disinclination, on religious
grounds, to leave the Sailor's Orphan Girl's School, and the com-;
mittee of the school had declined to compel her to leave and return
to her mother.
Shee, Serjt., and Finlason,besides the cases mentioned in the
judgment, cited .endes vs. Mendes, 1 Yes. sen. 89; 8 Atk. 619;
.Ex parte Hopkins, 3 P. Wins. 152; Jervis, C. J., in re Hakcewill,
12 C. B. 223, 230; Lord Cottenham in Warde vs. Warde, 2 Ph.
786 ; Forsyth on the Law of Infants, 72, citing Rex vs. Isley, 5
Ad. & El. 441; 6 Nev. & M. 730; Id. 76, citing Rex vs. Soper, 5
T. R. 278; M'Pherson on Infants, 185-141; 2 Stephen's Commentaries, 292, 2d ed.; Rex vs. Ward, 1 W. B1. 886; and an
Anonymous case, before Lord Eldon, cited in Lyons vs. Blenkin,
1 Jac. 254, note b..
O'Malley and Lush showed cause. They referred to stat. 12
Car. 2, c. 24, s. 9, which enables the father to appoint a testamentary guardian of his child under the age of twenty-one years ; 4 Bac.
Ab., "Guardian," F., citing Lord Anglesey vs. .Lord Ossory, 3
Keb. 528 ; Id., "Infancy,'" A.; Id., "Habeas Corpus," B., 139;
and Lord Mansfield in Rex vs. Delaval, 3 Burr. 1434, 1436.
.ovill, for the Commissioners of the Patriotic Fund, referred to
In re Arabella FrancesNorth, 11 Jur. 7, and stated the objections
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which the commissioners felt to the removal of the child from theschool, and contended that the child ought to be educated in the
religion of its father, according to the rule which was followed in
schools belonging to Chelsea and Greenwich Hospitals.
Skee, Serjt., in reply, cited Hall vs. Hall, 3 Atk. 721; and Littledale, J., in -Ezyarte Glover, 4 Dowl. 291.
Cur. adv. vult.
Lord

CAMPBELL,

C. J. now delivered the judgment of the court.

In this case we are to determine what directions ought to be
given by the court respecting Alicia Race, an infant of the age
of ten years and a few months, brought up under a writ of habeas
corpus, granted at the instance of her mother. On the one side
it is contended that we ought at once to order the child to be
delivered to the mother; and on the other, that we should ask
the child to make her election whether to go home with her mother,
or to return to the school from which her mother wishes to remove
her.
It is not disputed, that the father being dead without appointing
a guardian, the mother is now guardian for nurture; and it is laid
down in 3 Rep. 38 b., that guardianship for nurture continues till
the child attains the age of fourteen years.' An observation was
made that the commissioners of the school are in loco pareitis; but
this was little relied upon, and is wholly untenable. As a general
rule, it is admitted that if a child under the age of seven years is so
brought up, the court ought at once to order the child to be delivered to the guardian. But the contention is that between the
ages of seven and fourteen the court ought to examine the child, and
ascertain whether it has mental capacity to be competent to make
a choice; and, according to the degree of mental capacity which it
is found to possess, to hand it over to the guardian, or to liberate
it, and to desire it to go where it pleases.
With regard to the maintenance of the poor, a rule has been introduced, that while a child is under seven it shall not be separated
I Br.
gument.

Ab., "Garde," p1. 86, 101, 111, and Hale's P. C. 26, were also cited in ar-
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from the mother fof the purpose of being maintained by the parish
in which it is settled. Again: by Serjeant Talfourd's Act, 2 and
8 Vict. c. 54, s. 1, it is enacted, that where infants under the age
of seven years are in the sole custody or control of the father, the
Lord Ohancellor or the master of the Rolls may make an order
that such infants shall be delivered to and remain in the custody of
the mother until they attain the age of seven years.
Under seven is called the " age of nurture ;" but this is the peculiar nurture required by a child from its mother, and is entirely
different from guardianship for nurture, which belongs to the father
in his lifetime, even from the birth of the child. We can find no
distinction in the books as to the rights and incidents of this species
of guardianship from the time when it commences till the time when
it expires. One of these incidents is, that the guardian shall be
entitled to the custody of the person of the child. Without such
right he could not possibly perform the duties cast upon him as
guardian. He is to nurture the child: the legal sense of this word
is its natural and common sense in the English language, which Dr.
Johnson says is, " to educate, to train, to bring up." Accordingly,
from the case to be found in the Year Book, 8 Edw. 4, 7 b, to the
present time, it has ever been considered that the father, or whosoever else on his death may be the guardian for nurture, has by
law a right to the custody of the child, and shall maintain an action
of trespass against a stranger who takes the child. See the authorities, Core. Dig., " Guardian," ID.
The question then arises, whether a habeas corpus be the proper
remedy for the guardian to recover the custody of the child of which
he has been improperly deprived. Certainly, the great use of this
writ-the bQast of English jurisprudence-is to set at liberty any
of the Queen's subjects unlawfully imprisoned; and when an adult is
brought up under a habeas corpus, and found to be unlawfully imprisoned, he is to have his unfettered choice to go-where he pleases.
But with respect to a child under guardianship for nurture, the
child is supposed to be unlawfully imprisoned when unlawfully detained from the custody of the guardian; and when delivered to him
the child is supposed to be set at liberty. Bez vs. -DeMandeville,
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5 East. 220, clearly proves that such is the fit mode of proceeding
if the child is under seven. Is there any reason for following a different course between seven and fourteen ? The intellectual faculties of the child may be considerably developed in this interval, and
the child may now have a very strong inclination to leave the home
of the guardian, and from religious as well as frivolous motives, to
be educated at a different school from that which the guardian has
selected. But the consequences which would follow from allowing
such a choice, are most alarming. We must lay down a rule which
will be generally beneficial, although it may operate harshly in particular instances. If the proposed choice were given to the child,
the relation of guardian and ward would still subsist; the guardian
might retake the child wherever he finds it, and he might maintain
an action against the person who, contrary to his wishes, takes or
detains the child. Then how could nurture be carried mn with such
a doctrine, which, if established, would apply to every father of a
family in the kingdom, in respect of all his children, male and female, above the age of seven years ? If a father wishes to take his
son, when ten years old, from a private school where flogging is not
practiced, and send him to Eton, and the boy refuses to come home,
and is brought up by habeas corpus, is he to be permitted to say
that on consideration, be is of opinion that the private school is
preferable to any public school where flogging is permitted, and
therefore he makes his choice to return to the private school, the
master being willing to receive him? Or suppose that a Protestant
mother, guardian for nurture of a daughter seven years of age,
sends her to a boarding school professing to be a Protestant seminary; in a short time she finds that attempts have been successfully
made by teachers there to convert the girl to the. Roman Catholic
faith; the girl refuses to come home, saying, in analogy to the language used by Alicia Race, "I will not go home to my own mother;
I will stay here, where I may pray to the mother of God.' She is
in consequence, brought up by habeas corpus. Are we to examine
her, and, finding her of quick parts, and professing to be a sincere
convert to the Roman Catholic faith, to tell her, that in spite of the
wishes of her mother, she is at liberty to return to the school where
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she has been converted? Such a doctrine seems wholly inconsistent with parental authority, which both reason and revelation teach
As to respect as essential for the welfare of the human'race. Indeed, allusions were made during the argument at the bar to the
workings of prevenient grace, and to the words of our Lord, "Suffer little childien, and forbid them not, to come unto me, for of such
is the kingdom of heaven." It must be enough merely to say, that
the parental authority is in no degree weakened by such sacred doctrines or precepts ; for it is impossible, without irreverence, to show
how irrelevant they are. This suggests the extreme inconvenience
which would arise from the proposed examination of the child. If
there is to be an examination, it ought to be conducted before all
tle judges who are to take part in the adjudication; and, after
testing her mental acumen, we ought to ascertain whether it is upon
due investigation that she has imbibed a preference to Protestantism, and such an aversion to the Roman Catholic faith.
When we look into our law books, although we do not find the
exact age defined within which the court, on a habeas corpus, will
order the child to be delivered up to the parent or guardian 'without
examination, we do find cases where this course has been adopted,
the child being above seven years of age; and we find nothing to
indicate that the rights of guardian for nurture are in any r~spect
impaired during the period of guardianship. In Bez vs. Johnson,
(1 Str. 579; 2 Ld. Raym. 1333; S. 0., Mod. 214,) a female child,
nine years old, was brought up by habeas corpus in the custody of
her nurse, having a testamentary guardian appointed by the father.
The court at first doubted whether they should go any further than
to see that the child was not under any illegal restraint, but afterwards declared, that this being the case of a young child, who had
no judgment of her own, they ought to deliver her to her guardian,
although she was very unwilling to be taken from Mrs. Johnson,
her nurse, who was her near relation, and had cared for her very
tenderly and disinterestedly. It was afterwards said, in 2 Str. 982,
that Lord Raymond, who had been a party to this judgment,
repented of what he had done; but in his own report of the case he
throws no discredit upon it; and Lord Mansfield afterwards ex-
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pressed strong approbation of the case, and said, that if Lord Raymond had changed his mind, his first judgment was clearly the right
one. (Rex vs. Delaval, 1 W. Bl. 418). It is necessary to travel
through the cases seriatim, as they are all reviewed in Bex vs. Greenhill, (4 Ad. & El. 624; 6 Nev. & Al. 244), where the court laid
down the rule, that where a young person under twenty-one years
of age is brought before the court by habeas corpus, if he be of an
age to exercise a choice, the court leaves the infant to elect where,
he will go; but if he be not of that age, the court must make an,
order for his being placed'in the proper custody. Lord Denman.
Littledale, Williams, and Coleridge, JJ., all make age the criterion,
and not mental capacity, to be ascertained by examination. They
certainly do not expressly specify the age, but they cannot refer to.
seven as the criterion, and there is no intervening age making therights or responsibility of an infant till fourteen, when guardian-_
ship for nurture ceases, upon the supposition that the infant has
now reached the years of discretion.
When we attend to the authorities cited by the counsel for thecommissioners, we find some vague dicta, and even some decisions,.
which at first sight give a color to the doctrine of examination and
choice under fourteen, but which admit of an explanation entirelyconsistent with the claim of the guardian. In Rex vs. tS'mith, (2
Str. 982), Rez vs. Johnson, (1 Str. 579), is said to have been overruled, because a boy, who had not completed his fourteenth year,.
being brought up by habeas corpus, at the suit of the father, from.
the custody of an aunt, with whom he wished to live, was set at
liberty, instead of being delivered up to his father, and was allowed;
to return to his aunt. But Loid Mansfield, in commenting upon,
this case, gives the true ratio decidendi upon which, and upon which.
alone, it can be supported-" That case was determined right, for
the court was certainly right in refusing the infant to the father, of.
whose design in applying for the custody of his child they had a;
bad opinion." (Rez vs. Delaval, 8 Burr. 1487). There is an ad-.
mitted qualification on the right of the father or guardian, if be be.
grossly immoral, or if he wishes to have the child for any unlawful
purpose. The counsel for the commissioners relied much upon the
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case of Anne Lloyd, (3 Man. & G. 547; 4 Scott's N. R. 200),
where tho mother of an illegitimate child, between eleven and twelve
years of age, having obtained a habeas corpus directed to the putative fathor to bring it up, the court refused to order it to be delivere, to the mother, and declared that it might use its own discretion; and the child being unwilling to go with the mother, the court
would -ct allow the mother to take it by force. But ailo,, J., there
asked, (3 21an. & G. 548), "How does the mother of an illegitimate
child difler from a stranger?" And although the relat;on of the
mct::e2 ot her illegitimate child is recognized for come purposes, it
is clear that she Las over it all the rights of guardian for nurture.
From what was said Ly Lord Ellenborough in ?ex vs. HFj A4ns, (7
East, 57),it would appear that it is only while an illegit'mate child
is unzcr seven-an age during which the law of nature and the law
of the land both say that the child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, ought not to be separated from the moth-er-that the court
will interfere to proicct the custody of the mother. Tn A nve Lloyd's
case the child was considerably above that age. The only other
decision much relied upon as to the right of the parent. or gardian on
a habeas corpus was In re Preston, (5 Dowl. &L. 233; 11 Jnr. 1039),
where a most distinguished judge refused to grant a writ of habeas
corpus to bring up a legitimate child above the age of seven on the
alleged application of the mother, who had become guardian for
nurture, tie9 father be'g dead. But the application was mr (le under
a power of attorney, the mother remaining in the Fast Indies, so
that the child! coul!d not have been delivered to her. The real
orinien of my Brother Patteson upon this subjcCt w3 h,-e fortuatcy an opportunity of knowing, frein a note cf Si; ErsLine
Perry, late Chief Justice of Bombay, in a very intercstlig collection of " Oiental Cases" decided and puhliscd by him. A Parsee
faiy having detaincd an infant child from its f:-ther, v Parsee,
,n the ground that the father had embraced the Chri, itn religion;
M a habeas corpus the court had ordered the child to be given up
to the father. In another case, the court, on habeas corpus, had
ordered an Rindoo boy of twelve years of age, who professed to
have embraced Christianity, to be delivered up to his nither, who
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adhered to the Hindoo religion, and the judges refused to examine
the boy as to his capacity and knowledge of the Christian religion.
In similar cases the Supreme Court at Calcutta had followed a different course. There being no appeal in such matters to a higher
court, Sir Erskine Perry, for his subsequent guidance, very properly submitted the question to my Brother Patteson, whose reponse
was as follows :-" I cannot doubt that you were quite right in
holding that the father was entitled to the custody of his child, and
enforcing it by writ of habeas corpus. The general law is clearly
so, and even after the age of fourteen; whereas the boy was only
twelve. The right might, indeed, be forfeited by misconduct of a
very gross nature; but nothing of that kind appears to have been
brought forward. It may have been an act of imprudence originally in the father to place his boys with persons who were likely
to bring them up in religious opinions and faith contrary to their
father. I suppose he made some stipulation for avoiding this; but
whether he dic. or not, I do not think thct the law would be affected
thereby. Even if he had changed his mind on that subject, as well
as on the education of his boys in other respects, I know of no law
which forbids him to do so, or binds him to the arrangement which
he had at first made." (Oriental Cases, 109).
For these reasons and on these authorities we are of opinion, in
the present case, that prima facie the mother is entitled, as guardian for nurture, to have her child delivered over to her. Still she
may have forfeited her right by prior immoral conduct, or by proof
that she does not make the application bona fide, or by having some
illegal act in view when she has obtained possession of the child.
Accordiug to the case of Bex vs. Greenhill, (4 Ad. & El. 624; 6
Nev. &M. 244), the immorality, to extinguish the right of the parent
or guardian to the custody of the child, must be of a gross nature,
so that the child would be in serious danger of contamination by
living with him. But here no immorality whatever is imputed to
Mrs. Race, and she seems to have been a virtuous woman, well
deserving the ardent affection which her husband felt for her. An
attempt is made to show, that in applying for this writ she is a mere
tool in the hands of others. But, on carefully looking through the
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affidavits, we do not see that this charge is at all substantiated, and
we think that we are bound to give credit to what she swears as to
the purity and sincerity of her motives. In wishing to take her
two children from these Protestant schools she may act conscientiously, although not prudently; and when the boy was allowed to go,
she might not unnaturally desire to have the girl also, that they
might be educated together.
The answer to this application (if there be any) we think must
rest upon the ground that the mother was under a legal obligation
to educate her children in the Protestant faith, and that she now
seeks to get possession of her daughter with the intention of following a course with her which the law forbids. Had she been a testamentary guardian, and the will had directed that the children should
be educated as Protestants, we should not have ordered the girl to
be delivered up to the guardian, she intending to send the girl to a
Roman Catholic seminary. But she is guardian for nurture, with
all the rights belonging to a mother as surviving parent. The husband certainly was a, Protestant; his children had been baptized in
the Anglican Church, and he probably expected that they would be
brought up as Protestants, but his will is entirely silent upou this
subject; and in his most beautiful and affecting letter of the 25th
August, 1854, (showing him to have been the model of a Christian
soldier), he appears to have had unbounded confidence in her, and
to have left the education of the children entirely to her discretion.
Indeed, by marrying a Roman Catholic, and by permitting the
children in his lifetime to join in Roman Catholic prayers, he does
not seem to have had the horror of Popery felt by many pious Protestants. Still, if the proposition laid down can be supported, that it
was her duty, as guardian for nurture, from the simple fact of the
father having been a Protestant, to educate the children as Protestants, she would be contemplating what the law forbids, by wishing
to remove the children from a Protestant to a Roman Catholic
school. But no sufficient authority has been cited in support of
this proposition; and the mother becoming guardian by nature on
the death of the father, no provision to the contrary being made
by the will, she appears to us to have in all respects the -ame
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parental authority which might have been exercised by the father
had he survived the mother.
As the law stands, since the repeal of the statutes for persecuting
Papists, the question must be the same, under the actual circumstances of this case, as if the father had died a Roman Catfiolic,
and the mother surviving had been a Protestant. Would it in that
case have been unlawful for the mother to have brought up the
children as Protestants ? The case of Villareal vs. JIellish, (2
Swanst. 5331) and Talbot vs. The Earl of Shrewsbury, (4 My. &
C. 672), show that in such matters the courts know of no distinction between different religions, and will not interfere with the discretion of guardians as to the faith in which they educate their
wards. The authority relied upon to show that the ward must invariably be educated in the religion of the father is In re Arabella
Frances North, before Sir 3. L. Knight Bruce, V. C., (11 Jur. 7).
That case arising jointly on a return to a habeas corpus, and on a
petition for the .appointment of a guardian to children as wards of
the Court of Chancery, it is difficult to distinguish what was done
or said by the Vice-Chancellor as a common-law and as an equity
judge. He cannot be alleged to have decided anything upon this
point, and he had only to consider it with a view of determining
whether the children should for a few days, till a guardian was appointed, be in the custody of a Roman Catholic or of a Protestant
nurse. He certainly does draw an inference of fact, that the
father died a Protestant, although for some time before his death
he had conformed to the worship of the Roman Catholic Church,
and, when dying, he would not pprmit the ministration of a Protestant clergyman; and his Honor does express an opinion, that
although the wife had been formally admitted into the Roman Catholic Church, the children must be educated in the Protestant faith,
the father having given no directions upon the subject by will. But
this doctrine, if well founded, would only apply to the education of
wards of the Court of Chancery, respecting whom an equity judge,
representing the Queen as parens patrke, has a very large discretion, and may give directions beyond the scope of the duties of a
IS.
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guardian for nurture under the common law. Therefore, without
venturing to question the dictum of so eminent a judge, (although
it seems not altogether to accord with what was said by Lord Cottenham in Talbot vs. TIe E-arl of Bhrewsbury, 4 My. & C., 672),
we do not think it enough to show that the mother of this infant,
as guardian for nurture, was equally bound to educate the children
as Prostestants, or that she can be charged with an illegal purpose
when intending to send them to a Roman Catholic school.
The commissioners, in detaining this girl from her mother, have
no doubt acted from the most laudable motives; but they are wrong
in point of law in supposing that the mother, by committing .the
child to their care to be educated, has lost all right over her. In
the case cited from' the Year Books, (8 Edw. 4, 7 b), it was held,
that "if a guardian, by reason of nurture, delivers the infant to
another for instruction, he may afterwards retake the infant ;" and
this is vouched for good law by Comyns, C. B., in his Digest, tit.
"Guardian," D. It might be every way much better for this child
to remain in the school at Hampstead,- which appears to be in all
respects so admirably conducted, and we may individually deplore
her removal from it; but upon this matter, as there is nothing contrary to law in contemplation, we have no jurisdiction to determine;
and we think that we are bound, in the discharge of our judicial
duty, to order that the infant Alicia Race be delivered up to her
mother. We trust that she will ever be treated by her mother with
the affection and tenderness anticipated by her father in the letter
which he wrote when he foresaw that he was soon to fall in defence
of his country.
O'31alley applied to the court that the judgment might not be
immediately executed, upon an affidavit, which stated that on the
20th January a bill had been filed, at the instance of the committee
of the Sailors' Orphan Girls' School, making Alicia Race a ward of
Chancery; and that application would be made to Sir R. T. Kindersley, V. C., at the sitting of his court this day, for an injunction restraining the mother from interfering with the education of
her daughter, and further proceeding under the writ of habeas corpus granted by this court, or from acting under any order made
thereupoii.
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UPELL,
C. J.-It is my opinion that the order of this
Lord CA
court ought to be immediately executed. We have done our duty;
ie Vicc-Ohancellor will do his.
O'ifalley stated that he was informed that an injunction had been
granted.
Lord CAMPBELL, 0. J.-We can take no notice of the injunction.
The order of this court must be obeyed.-Order accordingly."

In the Court of the Queen's Bench, January, 1857.
IUIFREY vs. DALE AND OTIIERS.
1.

2

T. & M., brokers, employed by H. sold on his account to D., M. & Co., 'who
were also brokers, ten tons of linseed oil. On the 14th of August, 1855, the following sold note was sent by T. & M. to H:"Sold to Dale, Morgan & Co., for account of Mr. Charles Humfrey, ten tons of
linseed oil, of merchantable quality, at, &c. (stating the terms.)
"TaoNAs & MIooR, Brokers.
"Quarter per cent. brokerage to D., M. & Co., and a half to us."
On the same day the following bought note was sent by D., M. & Co. to T. &
"Sold this day for Messrs. Thomas & Moore, to our principals, ten tons of linseed oil, of merchantable quality, at, &c. (stating the same terms.)
DALE, MORGAN & Co., Brokers.

"Quarter per cent. to D., M. & Co."

1

2. D., Al. & Co. afterwards declined to accept the oil ; and on the 28th of February,
1856, they informed I. of the name of their principal for whom they had purchased.
3. H. afterwards brought an action against D., XI. & Co. for the price of the oil,
and at the trial parol evidence -was, admitted of a usage of trade in the city of
London, by which a broker making such a contract was held personally liable as
purchaser, if lie did not at the time of the contract disclose the name of his
principal :-H' 11, first, that there was clear evidence of a contract of bargain
and sale between the plaintiff as seller and the undisclosed principal of the defendants.
4. Secondly, that the evidence of the usage of trade, whether treated as explain' Sir R. T. Kindcrsley, V. C., subsequently, with the consent of the parties,.
heard the case in private, and delivered a judgment directing the education of the
child in the religion of the father.
: 211 L. Jodur. Rcp. 137, Q. ]3.
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ing the language of the written contract, or adding to it a tacitly implied incident., was properly admissible, and rendered the defendants themselves liable
under the contract.

This was an action for the price of a quantity of linseed oil, bargained and sold by the plaintiff to the defendants, and not accepted
by them.
Plea, denying the alleged bargain and sale.
At the trial, before Coleridge, J., at the Sittings in London,
during Easter term, 1856, it appeared that the plaintiff, in August,
1855, directed his brokers, Messrs. Thomas & Moore, to sell, on his
account, ten tons of linseed oil, to be delivered during the last fourteen days of February, 1856. Soon afterwards they informed the
plaintiff of the sale of- the oil, and handed to him the following
note:"Sold
frey, ten
ton, real
fourteen
allowing

"London, August 14, 1855.
to Dale, Morgan & Co., for account of Mr. Charles Humtons of linseed oil, of merchantable quality, at £44 per
tare and usual draft, to be free delivered during the last
days of February next, and paid for in ready money,.
£2 10s. per cent. discount.

"THOMAS & MOORE, Brokers.
" Quarter per cent. brokerage to D., M. & Co., and a half to us."

On the same day, the defendants sent to Thomas & Moore the
following note

"75, Old Broad street, London,
August 14, 1855.
"Sold this day for Messrs. Thomas & Moore, to our principals,
ten tons of linseed oil, of merchantable quality, at £44 per ton,
real tare and usual draft, to 'be free delivered during the last fourteen days of February next, and paid for in ready money, allowing
£2 10s. per cent. discount.
DALE, MORGAN &

" Quarter per cent. brokerage to D., M. & Co."

Co., Brokers.
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Thomas & Moore made an entry of the contract in their books,
but they did not send to the plaintiff any note corresponding with
that sent to them by the defendants. On the 27th of February,
1856, the defendants declined to accept the oil, stating that they
had made no contract with the plaintiff for the purchase of it, and
on the 28th of February they informed the plaintiff that Mr. William Shenk was their principal, for whom the purchase of the oil
had been made. Shenk had become bankrupt on the 2nd of February.
It was proved to be of everyday occurrence for brokers not to
disclose the names of their principal, and parol evidence was admitted of a custom in the city of London, in the case of contracts be
tween brokers in the Baltic trade, that if the brokers did not, at
the time of the contract, disclose the names of their principals, the
contract was termed a close contract, and the brokers themselves
were responsible for the completion of the contract to the seller or
buyer, as the case might be. It also appeared, that it was not
usual for the selling broker to do more than send a sold note to his
principal, when the buying broker sends in a bought note, as in the
present case. A verdict was, by direction of the learned judge,
found for the plaintiff for the sum claimed; leave being reserved
to the defendants to move to set the verdict aside, and enter a nonsuit.
A rule nisi for this purpose was afterwards obtained on the
grounds, first, that there was no evidence of the alleged contract;
and, secondly, that the evidence of the custom was not admissible.
Pigott and Jremplay showed cause (Nov. 4.)-The contract of
sale was between the plaintiff and the defendants, so as to make
the defendants liable. It is evidenced by two documents : first, the
sold note, sent by the defendants to Thomas & 'Moore, as the plaintiff's agents; that, alone, shows a contract upon which the defendants are liable, at all events, as the agents of an undisclosed principal. Story on Agency, 228, 229. Thomson vs. Davenyort'
shows that a party may look either to the agent or to the undis'2 Smith's Lead. Cas. 219.
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closed principal when discovered. But, secondly, the note entered
in the brokers' book shows that the contract was considered at the
time as upon a purchase by the defendants of the plaintiff. On one
or both, therefore, there is evidence of a contract of sale between
the plaintiff and the defendants.
J.-Patrsom vs. Gandasequil shows that the
liability of the agent is not confined to the case of a foreign principal.]
[WIGHTMAN,

Pennell vs. Alexander2 is an authority showing that Thomas &
Moore might consider the sold note as an authority to treat the
defendants as principals. But, further, the plaintiff is at liberty to
resort, if necessary, to the parol evidence of the custom. The
effect is not in any way to vary the terms of the written contract.
In the notes to Thompson vs. Davenport the authorities are collected and commented upon which establish that parol evidence is
admissible to charge, but not to discharge, a pdrty to the contract.
Here it is used for the purpose of charging a party as principal.
In Trueman vs. .oder 3 parol evidence tendered was held inadmissible, as it went to discharge the real party to the contract. That
case is clearly distinguishable from the present. Upon the same
principle the cases of Magee vs. Atkinson,4 Jfiggins vs. Senior,'
Carr vs. Jackson6 and Sehmalz vs. Avery,7 are authorities to support the admissibility of the evidence.
.anisty, in support of the rule.-There is no evidence of any
binding contract; but if evidence of any contract, it is, even if the
parol evidence be admitted, of a contract between Thomas & Moore
and the defendants, and not between the plaintiff and the defendants. The sold note shows that the defendants had sold for Thomas
& Moore to their principals, which means principals, if the defend1 15 East, 61.
2 3 El. & B. 283; s. c. 23 Law J. Rep. (x. s.) Q. B. 171.

a 11 Ad. & E. 599; s. c. 9 Law J. Rep. (x. s.) (F. B. 165.
4 2 Mec. & W. 440 -"s. c. 6 Law J. Rep. (N. s.) Exch. 115.
5 8 Ibid. 834; s. c. 11 Law J. Rep. (N. s.) Exch. 199.
6 7 Exch. Rep. 382; s. c. Law J. Rep. (N. s.) Exch. 137.

7 10 Q. B. Rep. 655; s. c. 20 Law J. Rep. (x. s.) Q. B. 228.
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ants have such. The entry in the brokers' book, not communicated
to the defendants, cannot alter the contract, and Thomas &Moore
ought to have been the plaintiffs. If once there is an election to
deal with a broker as principal, the parties cannot afterwards alter
the liability upon the contract. In Thompson vs. Davenport, and
that class of cases, the agent acted either for a foreign or an undisclosed principal, and goods being delivered to an agent, he was sued
as a principal, not having disclosed his principal. Here the principal
was disclosed before action was brought. The written document
itself then not disclosing thle evidence of the contract, recourse is
sought to be bad to parol evidence, to show that a different meaning
is to be given to the language of the document; but that, it is submitted, cannot be done.
Cur.adv. vult.

The judgment of the court' was now delivered by
LORD CAMPBELL,

C. J.-This was a rule to enter a nonsuit, and

the facts upon 'which the question to be decided arises, appear to be
the following :-The action was for the price of linseed oil alleged
to be bargained and sold by the plqintiff to the defendants, and not
accepted b theii. The plea denied the bargain and sale. The
plaintiff had employed Thomas & Moore, brokers, to sell the oil for
them. One Shenk was a buyer of oils, and had employed the defendants, who were brokers, to buy for him. The dealing in question was between the brokers, and after proof of the facts now
stated, in order to prove the specific contract, the plaintiff put in
two notes-tHis Lordship read the notes above set out.] And the
plaintiff further gave in evidence, without objection, that according
to the usage of the trade, whenever a broker purchased without
disclosing the name of his principal, he was liable to be looked to
as the purchaser. In this case the defendants had not disclosed
their principal's name till an unreasonable time after the contract
made, and when he bad become insolvent. It was then objected
that, upon this state of facts, there was no evidence of any contract, but if of any, that it was of a contract between Thomas &
' Lord Campbell, C. J., Coleridge, 3., Wightman, J. and Ere, .1.
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Moore and the defendants, not of a contract between the plaintiff
and them. And upon the argument the admissibility of the evidence of usage was debated, "upon which, therefore, it will be necessary for us to express our opinion.
Upon consideration, we think that there is no foundation for
either objection. Parol evidence was clearly admissible to show the
circumstances under which the contract was made, and the relation
of the plaintiff and the defendants to it, and to each other in respect
of it. It was shown, then, without the help of usage, that the
plaintiff was the owner of the oil, and that Thomas & Moore were
employed by him to sell it. By the note first stated the defendants
signing as brokers say they have sold for Thomas & Moore to their
own principal, whom they do not name, but for whom they by necessary implication say that they have bought. It cannot be doubted
that although they say in the note that they have sold for Thomas
& Moore, the plaintiff might show that Thomas & Moore were only
his agents, and that he was, in fact, the principal for 'whom the
defendants sold, and with whom, if with any one, as the seller, the
contract was made. But the defendants also state that they have
bought, for they say they have sold to a person who is their priiacipal, which must mean their principal as buyer in that transaction.
Whether they had authority from him so as to bind him by their
signature, is not now the question as against him, but as against
themselves, and they cannot deny that they have made such purchase as they themselves state. We have, then, as the case now
stands, clear evidence of a contract or bargain and sale between
the plaintiff as the seller and the undisclosed ptincipal of the defendants. The only remaining question is, having stated a purchase
for a third person as principal, is there evidence on which they
themselves can be made liable ? Now, neither collateral evidence,
nor the evidence of a usage of trade, is receivable to prove anything which contradicts the tenor of a written contract, but, subject
to this condition, both may. be received for certain purposes. To
use the language of Mr. Phillips (Vol. 2, p. 415, 10th ed.,) "Evidence of usage has been admitted as to contracts relating to transactions of commerce, trade, farming or other business, for the.pur-
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pose of defining what would otherwise be indefinite, or to interpret
a peculiar term, or to explain what was obscure, or to ascertain
xhat was equivocal, or to annex particulars and incidents which,
• thhough not mentioned in the contracts, were connected with them
or with the relations growing out of them, and the evidence in such
cases is admitted with the view of giving effect, as far as can be
(lone, to the presumed intention of the parties." Now, here, the
plaintiff did not seek by the evidence of usage to contradict what
the tenor of the note primarily imports, namely, that this was a
contract which the defendants made as brokers. The evidence,
indeed, is based on this ; the usage can have no operation except on
the assumption of their having so acted, and of there having been
a contract made with their principal; but the plaintiff by the evidence seeks to show that according to the usage of the trade, and
is those concerned in the trade understand the words used, they
imported something more, namely, that if the buying broker did
not disclose the name of his principal it might become a contract
with him, if the seller pleased. Supposing this incident had been
expressed on the face of the note, there would have been no objection to it as affecting the validity of the contract, for the effect of
it would only have been that the sale might be treated by the vendor
as a sale to the broker, unless he disclosed the name of his principal; if he did, that it remained a sale to the principal, assuming,
of course, the broker's authority to bind him. The case would then
be analogous to that of the delivery of goods on a contract of "sale
or return," where the goods pass only conditionally, that is, unless
the buyer within the linlit of'a reasonable time, if none be limited,
exercise the option of returning them: if he does, the contract falls
to the ground, and is defeated as if it had never been ; if he does
not, it takes effect from the time when it was made. Whether this
evidence be treated as explaining the language used, or adding a
tacitly implied incident to the contract beyond those which are
expressed, is not material: in either point of view it will be admis-.ible, unless it labors under the objection of introducing something
repugnant to, or inconsistent with the tenor of the written instrument.
And upon consideration of the sense in which that objection must
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be understood with reference to this question, we think it does not.
In a certain sense every material incident which is added to a written contract varies it, makes it different from what it appeared to
be, and so far is inconsistent with it. If by the side of the written
contract without, you write the same contract with, the added incident, the two would seem to import different obligations and be
different contracts. To take a familiar instance, by way of illustration,-on the face' of a bill of exchange at three months after
date,-the acceptor would be taken to bind himself to the payment
precisely at the end of the three months; but by the custom he is
only bound to do so at the end of the days of grace, which vary
according to the country in which the bill is made payable, from
three up to fifteen. The truth is, that the principle on which the
evidence is admissible is, that the parties have not set down on
paper the whole of the contract in all its terms, but those only
which were necessary to be determined in the particular case by
specific agreement, and which, of course, might vary infinitely;
leaving to implication and tacit understanding all those general and
unvarying incidents, which a uniform usage 'would annex, and
according to which they must in reason be understood to contract,
unless they expressly exclude them. To fall within the exception,
therefore, of repugnancy, the incident must be such as if expressed
in the written contract would make it insensible or inconsistent :
thus, to warrant bacon to be "prime singed," adding "that is to
say, slightly tainted"-Yates vs. Pym,' or to insure " all the boats
of a ship," and add "that is to say, all not slung on the quarter"Blackett vs. Royal -Exchange Assurance 2 'and other cases of the

same sort scattered through the books, wbuld be instances of contracts in which both the two parts could not have full effect given
to them if written down; and, therefore, when one part only is
expressed, it would be unreasonable to suppose that the parties
intended to include the other also. Without repeating ourselves, it
will be found that the same reasoning applies when the evidence is
'6 Taunt. 446.
2 Cr. & J. 244; s. c. 1 Law J. Rep. Emcb. 101.

HUMFEY vs. DALE AND OTHERS.

used to explain a latent ambiguity of language. But here, if all
that the plaintiff contends for had been expressed, the defendants
would have contracted thus : "we buy for our principal, but if we
do not disclose his name within a reasonable time we agree that you
may treat us as the purchasers," and it cannot be said that the latter
branch is inconsistent with the former, any more than the power to
return, subject to which the goods pass, is inconsistent with their
passing. There is a case of Bywater vs. Bic7tardson,l which illustrates this. It was an action of deceit for the breach of a warranty
of soundness in the sale of a horse; the warranty was in writing,
absolute and unconditional in its form, and the horse was unsound;
yet it was held an available defence to show that by a rule of the
repository at which the horse was sold, known to the' plaintiff, all
warranties there given were to be in force only until twelve at noon
on the day following- the sale, unless meantime a notice of the
unsoundness, with a certificate from a surgeon, was delivered at the
office. Here, the rule known to the parties is exactly analogous to
the usage of trade ; the warranty did not in its terms import that it
was binding for all time exclusively of the rule; it was not, therefore, inconsistent with those terms, to import a limitation of time,
and by virtue of the rule it was held, that the parties had impliedly
imported it. Brown vs. .B//rn has been so lately decided by us,
and we there expressed ourselves so fully on this point, that we need
do no more than refer to it. But our Brother Pigott in showing
cause against the rule cited, for the purpose of distinguishing it, the
case of Truman vs. Loder, and it is certainly a difficulty in his
way-not as to the decision itself, which is quite consistent with our
present observations, but in respect of a collateral matter there said
to have been determined. That was an action for non-delivery of
tallow; the sale was effected by a broker, one Woolner, acting for
both parties, and signing both the bought and sold notes; in the
former, the purchase was described to.be for Truman & Cook, the
plaintiffs, in the latter the sale was expressed to be for Mr. Edward
Higginbotham to my principals, and the main struggle in the case
I Ad. &E. 508; s. e. 8 Law J. Rep. K. B. 164.
z 3 El. & B. 703; s. c. 23 Law 3. Rep. (x. s.) Q. B. 312.
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was to make the defendant liable as trading under the name and
through the instrumentality of Higginbotham, and there could be
no doubt as to the soundness of the principle on which that might
be done if the facts bore it out.
But in the judgment it is stated that the defendant on the trial
sought to put this question, " whether it was not a custom in the
tallow trade that under such contracts a party may reject the undisclosed principal and look to the broker for the completion of the
contract," and that this question was not allowed to be put, which
ruling the court confirmed. How this question could have any
bearing on the matter in issue, where the contract apparently
disclosed both principals, and where the plaintiff was seeking
to enforce it against a disclosed principal (for such as to the
present point Loder must be taken to have been under another
name,) it is certainly difficult to see ; and this difficulty is pointed
out in the judgment. In it the same principle was admitted on
which the plaintiff here rules; but it was thought in the application
of that principle that the term in question sought to be annexed to
the contract would be inconsistent with its tenor. We do not cite
Hodgson vs. Davies,' as a legal decision to be opposed to this.
Lord Denman dealt with it in the judgment in question, and shows
how little it can be supposed to carry with it the weight of Lord
Ellenborough's opinion. But we refer to it in connection with Truinan vs. Loder, because, both cases, we think, disclose how entirely
the minds of lawyers are under different influence from that which,
in spite of them, will always influence the practice of traders, which
practice creates the usages of trade. The former desire certainty,
and would have a written contract express all its terms, and desire
that no parol evidence beyond it should b6 receivable. But merchants and traders, with a multiplicity of transactions pressing upon
them, and moving in a narrow circle and meeting each other daily,
desire to write little, and leave unwritten what they take for granted
in every contract. In spite of the lamentations of judges, they will
continue to do so, and ina vast majority of cases, of which courts of
law hear nothing, they do so without loss or inconvenience, and upon
'2 Campb. 530.

